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NOTES
can be regulated in the interest of public health, 28 that since such
a business need not technically be affected with a public interest
in order that price fixing be regulated, 2 and that since the prices
which barbers may charge appear to be (particularly in view of
the Minimum Wage decision) 0 not "demonstrably irrelevant" 8'
to public health, we believe that the Louisiana Supreme Court
reached a legally correct and socially desirable conclusion.
H.M.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-STATE SLUM CLEAR-
ANCE HOUSING PROJECTS-The "Slum Clearance" Act' represents
one of the most recent pieces of social legislation enacted by the
Louisiana legislature. The Act authorizes the creation of public
corporations in cities having population in excess of 20,000, with
power to investigate living and housing conditions and to develop
projects for clearing, replanning and reconstructing slum areas in
order to provide housing accommodations for persons of low in-
come.2 To test the constitutionality of the act, the Attorney Gen-
eral of the State brought suit 3 to enjoin the City of New Orleans
and the newly created New Orleans Housing Authority from pro-
ceeding with the proposed slum clearance project. Held, that the
Act is constitutional since it has for its object the expropriation
of land and expenditure of public funds for the public use.4 State
ex rel Porterie, Attorney General v. New Orleans Housing Au-
thority, 182 So. 725 (La. 1938).
It is a matter of common knowledge that slums exist through-
out the United States.5 It is equally undoubted that there is a
close relationship between slums and disease, crime delinquency
28. State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie, 40 Wyo. 74, 275 Pac. 106
(1929); State v. Zeno, 79 Minn. 80, 81 N.W. 748 (1900); State v. Armeno, 29
R. I. 431, 72 Atl. 216 (1909); State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775 (1907).
29. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R.
1469 (1934).
30. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703,
108 A.L.R. 1330 (1937).
31. See note 19, supra.
1. La. Act 275 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) §1 6280.1-6280.26].
2. Id. § 8 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) § 6280.8].
3. In virtue of La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 56.
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, §§ 1, 5.
5. Engle, Housing Conditions in America, as Revealed by The Real
Property Inventory (1934) 17; Wood, Slums and Blighted Areas in the United
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and immorality.' Merely to place piecemeal restrictions upon
existing slum areas, or even to clean up entirely a single slum
area will not blot out the slum evil. It will only lead to the
creation of new slums. The essential need is to eradicate slums
completely and to prevent their rebirth. This can only be accom-
plished by providing safe and sanitary dwellings at low rent for
those who formerly lived in the demolished slum areas.7
The power of eminent domain may be exercised only for a
public purpose or a public use.8 There is no comprehensive or
exclusive definition of the terms "public purpose" and "public
use." The definition varies not only among the different states
but also with respect to the federal government.10 Whether the
condemnation of land for a rehousing project is a proper federal
States, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, Housing Divi-
sion, Bulletin No. 1 (1935) 25-74, 77 et seq.
6. Hartsough and Caswell, Housing and its Relationship to Delinquency
and Crime, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, Housing
Division, Bulletin No. 2, part 2, section 5.
7. It was argued on behalf of the Housing Authority of New Orleans
that the conviction was nation-wide that only public authority armed with
broad governmental powers could cope with this evil. "Thirty-two states of
the Union, besides our own, representing most of the states having large
urban communities, have adopted legislation in terms almost paralleling the
Louisiana Housing Authorities Law. Ala. Gen. Acts, 1935, No. 56, p. 126; Ark.
Acts of 1937, No. 298; Cal. Laws of 1938, Extra Sess., c. 4; Colo. Sess. Laws of
1935, cc. 131, 132; Conn. Laws of 1936, Spec. Sess., c. 33c; Del. Rev. Code 1935,
c. 160; Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 16; Fla. Laws of 1937, c. 17981, Act No.
275; Ga. Laws of 1937, Act No. 411; Ill. Smith-Hurd Anno. Stat. c. 67%; Laws
of Ill. 3d Spec. Sess. 1934, p. 159; Ind. Acts 1937, c. 207; Ky. Acts 1934, c. 113;
Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 32; Mass. Acts 1933, c. 364, amended by Mass.
Acts 1935, c. 449; Miss. Laws of 1938, House Bill No. 694; Mont. Laws 1935, c.
140; Neb. Laws 1935, c. 29; N. J. Laws of 1938, c. 19; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 4,
amended by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 310; N. C. Pub. Laws 1935, c. 456; N. D. Laws
of 1937, c. 102; Ohio Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1935, c. 1078, p. 56; Ore. Laws of 1937,
c. 442; Pa. Laws of 1937, P. L. p. 955, Act No. 265; R. I. Acts Spec. Sess. 1935,
c. 2253; S. C. Laws 1935, Nos. 301, 345, pp. 424, 500; Tenn. Acts Spec. Sess.
1935, c. 525; Texas, Laws of 1937, House Bill No. 821, as amended by Laws of
1937, 2d Called Sess., House Bill No. 102; Va. Laws of 1938, House Bill No.
227; Vt. Laws of Vt. 1937, Act No. 231; W. Va., Acts of W. Va. 1933, Extra
Sess., c. 93; Wis. Laws of 1935, c. 525, as amended by Laws of 1937 Spec. Sess.,
cc. 10, 15. Hawaii also has a housing authority act: Hawaii Laws 1935, c. 262A.
Michigan has authorized cities to engage in housing directly: Mich. Laws
1935, p. 132." Brief on Behalf of Defendants-Appellees, pp. 40-41, State ex rel.
Gaston L. Porterie, Attorney General v. Housing Authority of New Orleans,
182 So. 725 (La. 1938).
8. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1909) § 252.
9. Id., §§ 257, 258; Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 376 (1891); Tan-
ner v. Treasury Tunnel Min. & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464, 4
L.R.A. (N.S.) 106 (1906).
10. It is undoubted that, in order for the federal government to condemn
land, it must be shown that the use for which the land is taken falls within
one or more of the delegated powers of the federal government, or that the
purpose of the condemnation is necessary and proper in order to carry such
power into effect. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
16 S.Ct. 427, 40 L.Ed. 576 (1896).
NOTES
"public use" is as yet undetermined. Two decisions of the Circuit
Courts of Appeal which reach opposite conclusions are United
States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, Kentucky" and Oklahoma
City v. Sanders.'2 The decision in the latter case was rendered
with full cognizance of the decision in the former, yet the court
held that such condemnation by the federal government was a
"public use" since the beneficial effects of such projects affect the
nation as a whole and promote the public welfare. 8 There has
been as yet no holding on this problem by the United States
Supreme Court.
Many of the state courts have committed themselves to the
view that "public use" means an actual user by the public."' In
this light, condemnation for slum clearance would be viewed as
a private use, since only a limited class of the public can be
expected to actually "use" the new housing facilities. Other
state courts incline toward the view that "advantage to the pub-
lic" is the proper test."5 Judged by this standard, rehousing
projects should receive judicial approval.
The Louisiana Supreme Court deemed the latter test the
more enlightened view. It agreed that slum eradication is con-
ducive to the general welfare and therefore is a public advantage
in protecting the morals and health of the people and in providing
for their safety.16 The court went so far as to say: "All govern-
mental activities, complicated as they are, have that simple end
in view."'" It is true that there is dicta in a prior case'8 which
would seem to indicate that the Louisiana courts are inclined to
the strict view that a "public use" means a general public right
to a definite use of the property rather than the more liberal view
that "public use" or "public purpose" means a benefit to the
public. However, in the instant case the court inferentially re-
11. 78 F. (2d) 684 (C.C.A. 6th, 1935).
12. 94 F. (2d) 323 (C.C.A. 10th, 1938).
13. Id. at 327.
14. See 54 A.L.R. 15, § 1I1, and cases there cited.
15. Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11, aff'd, 253 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct.
499, 64 L.Ed. 878 (1920); Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal. App. 1, 266 Pac. 1029
(1928); New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. (2d)
153 (1936); Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W. (2d) 651 (1937); Marvin v.
Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 183 So. 145 (Fla. 1938); Dornan v. Phila-
delphia Housing Authority, 200 Atl. 834 (Pa. 1938); Wells. v. Housing Authority
of Wilmington, 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938).
16. State ex rel Porterie, Attorney General v. New Orleans Housing
Authority, 182 So. 725, 733 (La. 1938).
17. Ibid.
18. River & Rail Terminals v. La. Ry. & Navigation Co., 171 La. 223, 234,
130 So. 337, 340 (1930).
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jected this idea. It is suggested that the reason for such distinc-
tion in interpretation is due to the theory that public policy ought
to favor a liberal interpretation of the term "public use" or
"public purpose" where the right to condemn is sought to be
utilized by public agencies, and favor a strict interpretation where
the right is claimed by private parties or private corporations.
F.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM
TAXATION-FEDERAL TAXATION OF EMPLOYEES OF BI-STATE CORPORA-
TION-Respondents were employed by the Port of New York Au-
thority, a bi-state corporation created by compact between New
York and New Jersey, the purpose of which was to carry on an
extensive program of port development. The Authority in fur-
thering this program constructed and now operates interstate
bridges and tunnels and a freight terminal. It also operates a bus
line. The United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue deter-
mined deficiencies in respondents' income tax reports for the
years 1932 and 1933. The Board of Tax Appeals exempted the
salaries received by the respondents from the Authority and the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this rul-
ing.' Thereupon the Commission appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.
The burden placed upon the states by the taxation of such salaries
is so remote, speculative and uncertain that by their exemption
the federal taxing power would be restricted without any sub-
stantial protection thereby accruing to the state government.
Moreover, such a tax does not incumber any function that has
hitherto been considered essential to the states' existence as such.
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S.Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 962
(1938).
The doctrine of the immunity of federal instrumentalities
from state taxation dates from the celebrated case of McCulloch
v. Maryland.2 This doctrine has also been applied to officers of
the federal government. 8 It is reciprocal in that the states and
their officers and instrumentalities are likewise immune from
1. 92 F. (2d) 999 (1937).
2. 17 U.S. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
3. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. 435, 10 L.Ed. 1022
(1842).
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